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I. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE CRIMuNALrrY'
A. Introduction
Baron Thurlow, an 18th Century Lord Chancellor of England, is
reported to have exclaimed, "Did you ever expect a corporation to have
a conscience, when it has no soul to be damned, and no body to be
* Joseph D. Jamail Centennial Chair in Law, University of Texas School of Law. B.A., J.D.,
University of California at Berkeley.
1. For detailed treatment of the issues discussed in this article, see K. BRICKEY, CORPORATE
CRIMINAL LIABILrrY (1984). See generally, CORPORATIONS AS CRIMINALS (E. Hochstedler ed. 1984);
NEW DEVELOPMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES ON CORPORATE CRIME LAW ENFORCEMENT IN AMERICA (L.
Orland & H. Tyler eds. 1987). Among leading law review commentaries are Elkins, Corporations and
the Criminal Law: An Uneasy Alliance, 65 Ky. L.J. 73 (1976); Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate
Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1141 (1983); Note,
Developments in the Law, Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal
Sanctions, 92 HARv. L. REv. 1227 (1979).
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kicked." One report has him adding, "And, by God, it ought to have
both."2 Less dramatically, a fragmentary "note" by Chief Justice Holt
in 1701 states, "A corporation is not indictable, but the particular mem-
bers of it are."3 Blackstone's Commentaries were to the same effect.4
The disjunction between individual and corporate criminal
liability was not surprising. In the law of torts, judges did not refine
the principles of respondeat superior-under which one will be liable
for acts done on its behalf-until the second half of the 19th Century.
5
Although this article will explore differences between civil and criminal
principles of liability, the criminal law principles owe an evident and
continuing debt to those developed on the civil side. In brief, a cor-
poration-at least under federal law as it now stands-will likely be
held criminally liable for acts of agents within the scope of their duties,
but will escape liability if the agent was "going on a frolic of his own."6
B. The Theoretical Basis of Coiporate Criminal Liability
The corporation is a capital-pooling device and its rise as a legal
fiction is an essential part of economic development.7 This is so
whether the capital is in private or public hands-the corporate entity
is a part of legal ideology in both capitalist and socialist legal systems.
Inevitably, the debate over corporate liability is influenced by one's
personal views about corporations and their power over economic life,
and by one's theories of the best means of persuading corporate direc-
tors and management to enforce law compliance by employees.
Management theory or microeconomics have more to tell us about such
issues than does legal history.
While many analogies lie ready to hand, permitting one to justify
a wide range of approaches to corporate criminal liability, they do not
give us a rational basis for choosing one approach over another. If
2. Quoted in Coffee, "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into the
Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. Rev. 386 at n.1 (1981) (discussing extensively
competing theories of corporate criminal liability). See also Mueller, MensRea and the Corporation:
A Study of the Model Penal Code Position on Corporate Liability, 19 U. Pirr. L. REv. 21 (1957) (a
learned critical and comparative study of corporate criminal liability by an early critic of traditional
American theories).
3. Anonymous (No. 935), 88 Eng. Rep. 1518 (1701).
4. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAPJES *476.
5. 3 AM. JuR. 2D, Agency, §§ 270-95 (1986) (imputed negligence, respondeat superior and
imputed knowledge).
6. This classic formulation is from Joel v. Morison, 172 Eng. Rep. 1338, 1339 (1834) (Parke, B).
7. See generally M. TGAR, LAW & THE RISE OF CAPITALISM (1977).
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one is not simply to borrow principles of civil liability devised for
other reasons, it becomes necessary to examine the rationale for making
the corporate entity, as distinct from its human agents, guilty of a crime.
It is no universal solvent to declare that a corporation should be
a criminal defendant because the aggregation of capital it represents
poses a greater risk of harm if that power is used for criminal purposes.
Such a rationale would support a decision to make the corporation
civilly liable for its misdeeds, but sweeps little farther. There is, how-
ever, no question that this rationale underpins a great deal of federal
law criminalizing corporate conduct. The decision to criminalize should
not be made so casually. Criminal conduct, as Henry Hart reminded
us, "is conduct which, if duly shown to have taken place, will incur a
formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the
community."8 Criminalizing a broad range of otherwise marginally ac-
ceptable business conduct trivializes the criminal sanction and breeds
contempt for it, at least among rational actors, which most white collar
offenders are.
C. Regulatory Offenses
Regulatory offenses aimed at corporations have proliferated as part
of administrative schemes enacted in the past half-century. Often they
are part of a regulatory system that includes administrative, civil and
criminal sanctions. Look, for example, to the fields of securities law,
health, safety, and environmental control? Most statutes in these fields
reflect the rule that "Congress may in certain areas impose criminal
liability for the mere doing of the proscribed act wholly unrelated to
knowledge, actual or constructive."' 0 In addition to punishing the cor-
poration for conduct done without criminal intent, such statutes also
permit prosecution of corporate managers for conduct they have merely
"permitted" or tolerated."
Regulatory statutes emphasize heavy fines. Typically, though not
invariably, they are petty offenses or misdemeanors. Corporate
8. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401,405 (1958).
9. Examples are collected in Brickey, Criminal Liability of Corporate Offlcersfor Strict Liability
Offenses-Another View, 35 VAr,. L. REv. 1337 (1982).
10. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 125 (5th Cir. 1962).
11. See Brickey, supra note 9. See also United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658,674 (1975) (conviction
of supermarket executive upheld under Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act based upon his position in the
company, which gave him authority "to deal with the situation"). Park presents the converse to the
situation discussed in this chapter. the officer is held liable based upon wrongdoing that is attributed
to the corporation.
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liability is not triggered by conduct done with the intent to violate the
law, or even necessarily with knowledge that harm is likely. There
may be no "mens rea" requirement at all. In many cases, the harm
could be redressed as well by private lawsuits or government-initiated
civil/administrative proceedings.
The threat of the sanction, however, extends beyond the fine that
may be involved, and can trigger administrative and civil settlements
favorable to the agency, often in an effort to avoid the collateral es-
toppel consequences of an adjudication of guilt based upon a plea of
guilty or a trial.
These "public welfare" offenses came into being out of a percep-
tion that modem business and industry had begun to create new dangers
to public health and safety. The lack of a mens rea requirement reflects
a legislative judgment that whoever courts such dangers should be
charged with knowledge of the risks and of the requirements imposed
by increasingly detailed statutes and regulations. It is wrong to say
that one is "presumed" to know the rules, because a presumption must
have some factual basis." "Conclusive presumption" is an oxymoronic
expression for "rule of law." In the criminal law, this point is made
most clearly by the Supreme Court's decisions that one cannot presume
that a defendant intended the consequences of his acts. 3
Criminal sanctions under such circumstances sometimes betoken
nothing more than a legislative determination to visit extra opprobrium
on behavior that the legislation's sponsors find particularly galling. At
a more studied level, the potential criminal sanction may confer added
investigative authority on the agency charged with enforcement. The
risk of criminal liability, even for a misdemeanor or petty offense, also
carries the risk that the errors and omissions insurance of the corporate
management and directors will not cover an alleged failure to supervise
the responsible employees. Criminal exposure may carry adverse con-
sequences in the securities and debt markets.
Because these statutory rules are myriad, each with a special body
of lore, and because they describe "crimeless crimes"'4 that are tradi-
tionally spoken of as presenting exceptions to principles of criminal
12. See, e.g., United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 139 (1965) (statutory presumption that
presence at illegal still authorized conviction for possession, custody and control of still violates due
process of law because basic fact not sufficiently related to presumed fact).
13. See, e.g., Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211,213 n.2 (1988) (citing Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S.
510(1979)).
14. This is a characterization by Judge Brown of the facts ofLiparota v. United States, 471 U.S.
419 (1985), in his cogent dissenting opinion in United States v. Meyer, 864 F.2d 214, 220 (1st Cir.
1988).
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statutory construction, they will make no further appearance in this
article.
D. The Corporation and Serious Crimes
I turn, therefore, to the corporation's liability for "true" crimes.
Some crimes are thought to be, in their nature, "human," and could
not be attributed to a corporation--"bigamy, perjury, rape . . . [and]
murder" are often listed in this category.' 5 While such limitations are
arguable, 16 few would dispute that a corporation should be prosecutable
for economic crimes committed in its name.
While, as noted above, theories of liability, and justifications for
theories abound, one is necessarily speaking in a relative vacuum. It
is difficult to prove that a particular theory of corporate criminal
responsibility enhances compliance, redresses victim harm or deters
others. This is, however, no reason to forego the inquiry.
When dealing with individual crime, we necessarily indulge an
assumption about human beings: They are capable of rationally choos-
ing to obey rather than break the law. We administer the criminal law
"as if" this were true. The "as if" is far closer to demonstrated reality
in the case of corporate crime. The typical corporate crime is under-
taken as part of a plan to benefit the entity, and is usually the result
of demonstrable economic calculation. The hope of benefit may be
chimerical, and the risks far greater than the actor supposed, but it is
easier to "see" the plan, like the strings of a puppet when one sits close
to the stage. This has been a dominant assumption in construing
criminal statutes applicable to corporations," and the author's ex-
perience in representing corporations and their employees bears it out.
If, therefore, risk of detection and punishment will be an element in
the calculus of potential wrongdoing, making the corporation criminally
liable can deter.
15. Mueller, supra note 2 at 22.
16. Id. For example, if a corporate executive sexually assaults an employee as part of a pattern of
harassment, one could certainly propound a rational theory that would make the corporation criminally
liable for that act. In United States v. Condolon, 600 F.2d 7 (4th Cir. 1979), the defendant ran a bogus
talent agency as a means of seducing women. Had the agency been incorporated, it, as well as its
satyriacal owner, would both have been liable for wire fraud under federal law and fornication if the
latter offense was part of state law. Corporations also routinely "swear" by their agents to the truth of
statements and thus can be guilty of false statement offenses. See, e.g., Nye & Nissen v. United States,
336 U.S. 613 (1949) (corporation guilty under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 for submitting false statements).
17. See generally United States v. United States Gypsum Co, 438 U.S. 422 (1978) (intent
requirement for liability under Sherman Act).
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The next inquiry is, whose acts should bind the corporation and
affix criminal liability. Powerful arguments are made that only acts
commanded, encouraged, consented to or tolerated by relatively senior
management should occasion liability.'8 The argument in favor of such
a limitation is that only when management knows, or would have a
reason to know, of illegality could they be expected to stop or prevent
it. Therefore, deterrence is possible only under such circumstances.
The Model Penal Code and many state penal codes adopt such an ap-
proach.
The counter-argument, which is accepted by the federal courts,
and documented at length below, is that in the absence of a legislative
provision to the contrary, the corporation should be liable for all acts
done by any employee within the scope of duty and intended to benefit
the corporation. This view is supported by at least three powerful
considerations. First, the argument for a narrower rule is based upon
unwarranted assumptions about corporate managerial behavior.
Managers do not necessarily measure each transaction in the informed,
rational fashion that is more typical of long-range planning. They do
not, that is, sit down as the Chicago economists sometimes imagine
and compute the benefits of crime, discounted by the product of the
potential sanction and the risk of being caught. Indeed, considerable
evidence suggests that managers make many decisions on a relatively
ad hoc basis, seeking a path of consensus or "minimal hassle." This
sort of decision-making lends itself peculiarly to decisions that appear
to satisfy short-term needs perceived as urgent, while ignoring both the
enterprise's ultimate interest and the law's requirements.
There is no single answer to this gap in the deterrent power of
criminal sanctions, but one sure though partial remedy is to create a
climate in the enterprise in which law-violation is repudiated and
scorned. Management must make clear at every level that the
enterprise does not want the proceeds of illegality. 9 Therefore, rules
of corporate liability must encourage management to put such a preven-
tive system in place. Such rules will inevitably affix criminal liability
18. Miller, Corporate Criminal Liability: A Principle Extended to its Limits, 38 FED. BAR J. 49,
53-56 (1979) (citing authorities). Perennial legislative proposals to adopt such a standard in federal law
have drawn warm support. Philip Lacovana will soon publish an article supporting such legislation. A
contrary view is taken in Comment, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Other Arguments Against
a Due Diligence Defense to Corporate Criminal Liability, 29 UCLA L. REv. 447 (1982).
19. As the former General Counsel of Mobil Corporation put it in a phone interview, "you have
got to make clear that the company does not want the proceeds of dishonesty, and will sanction
employees who break the law."
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for a far broader range of conduct than in the Model Penal Code for-
mulation. They may also provide for fines and other punishment large
enough to have a certain impact upon decision-makers. Corporate
policy decisions taken at the top affect worker safety, environmental
contamination, and hundreds of other important issues. When oil spills
from a well blowout, does the lower-level manager think first of
cleanup at all costs, or first about legalisms and shortcuts? The answer
will depend not on specific managerial decisions, but on the
corporation's internal culture. Broad rules of corporate criminal
liability shape that culture towards law-abiding behavior at all levels
of the structure.
Another argument for casting wide the criminal liability net arises
from the operation of collateral estoppel. Much crime committed in
the corporate name has widespread economic consequences. This is
most obvious in the antitrust area, but may be seen as well in fraud,
extortion, and some kinds of bribery. Ferreting out crimes of this sort
is usually beyond the means and expertise of private plaintiffs. The
human perpetrators typically act in what they suppose to be the
corporation's interest and the corporation is typically the principal
beneficiary of their criminal acts. The damage done may be spread
among so many people that no one of them will have the economic
motivation to seek redress. The barriers to class suits by such people
are daunting.2 Corporate liability for the criminal act is thus a means
of promoting, encouraging and facilitating civil recovery. This is a
legitimate function of government, provided always that in striving to
make alleged victims whole we do not trivialize the criminal sanction.
A final, quite practical, justification for casting the net wide is
this: If the corporation cannot be criminally liable without the com-
plicity or at least acquiescence of top management, every corporate
plea of guilty puts management at serious risk of a suit by the
shareholders. Such a suit would usually be derivative, asserting the
corporation's claim that the offending managers or directors should
make the entity whole for what it had to pay in fines and legal fees.21
20. For example, the class representatives must make a sizeable initial investment in notifying
class members. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). The required funds will be much
easier to raise if the uncertainty as to result is diminished by a prior criminal prosecution of the
defendants.
21. Treatment of derivative suit, business judgment and director/officer liability is beyond the
scope of this article. The single most valuable resource on these issues is D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S.
RADIN, THE BusiNEss JuDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DuTIEs OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS & OFFICERS
(2d ed. 1988).
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If, however, the corporation's guilt does not necessarily implicate
management, the corporation can intercede with the government and
negotiate a corporate plea agreement that will spare individuals from
criminal prosecution. The corporation need not, under the broad view
of liability, admit by such an agreement that management was at fault.
Experienced practitioners know that early, effective advocacy is im-
portant when a corporation and its employees are under federal inves-
tigation. Often, the lawyer will reluctantly understand that the lengthy
delay between a formal charge and the end of the process will itself
impose unacceptable burdens on the company. This will be so even
if the corporation is ultimately victorious. "You can beat the rap, but
you can't beat the ride," as the trite old saying goes.
Pleading the corporation while not admitting management cul-
pability will often be an acceptable compromise. While the corporation
suffers the consequences of a criminal conviction, the limits of its
liability are known and negotiated.
E. Federal Law on Corporate Liability
Title 1, United States Code, section 1 says that in Acts of Con-
gress, "the words 'person' and 'whoever' include corporations, com-
panies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock
companies, as well as individuals."2 This statute provides the sole
statutory justification for applying most criminal offenses, in title 18
of the United States Code and in other titles, to corporations." These
words provide Delphic guidance: At most they tell us whether a cor-
poration might be prosecuted. They tell us nothing about when it is
right to make it so.
Federal decisional law has firmly established, however, that the
corporation will be guilty of a crime if an employee or employees,
acting within the scope of their duties and with the intent to benefit
the corporation, commit all the elements of the offense. As noted in
Section II, there has been some erosion at the edges of this stark rule,
but it remains virtually intact.
The federal rule is generally traced to the Supreme Court's
decision in New York Central Railroad v. United States.24 Although
22. See Coleman, Is Corporate CriminalLiability Really Necessary, 19 Sw. LJ. 908,913 (1975).
23. Id. at 913 n.32 (citing United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121 (1958)); Alamo
Fence Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1957).
24. 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
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the Court's reasoning was foreshadowed in earlier federal and state
cases,2 New York Central Railroad did not involve the general federal
criminal law at all. The railroad was indicted, along with its assistant
traffic manager, for violation of the Elkins Act.26 The manager had
paid illegal rebates to shippers, apparently as an inducement to do busi-
ness.
The Elkins Act provided that a corporation would be deemed guilty
of any statutory misdemeanor committed by any of its officers, direc-
tors, employees or agents. In addition, the Act provided that "the act,
omission or failure of any officer, agent or other person acting for or
employed by any common carrier, acting within the scope of his
employment, shall in every case be also deemed to be the act, omission
or failure of such carrier, as well as of that person."'27
The railroad's principal argument was that the statute transgressed
upon the due process clause because "to thus punish the corporation
is in reality to punish the innocent stockholders, and to deprive them
of their property without opportunity to be heard." The corporation's
lawyers also argued that the statute deprived it of the presumption of
innocence.
The Court noted that Holt and Blackstone had declared the cor-
poration not capable of crime, but that "the modem authority, univer-
sally .... is the other way."29
Since a corporation acts by its officers and agents their purposes,
motives, and intent are just as much those of the corporation as
are the things done. If, for example, the invisible, intangible
essence of air, which we term a corporation, can level mountains,
fill up valleys, lay down iron tracks, and run railroad cars on them,
it can intend to do it, and can act therein as well viciously as
virtuously 0
The Court summarized the respondeat superior law of tort as at-
tributing to the corporation all acts of agents within the scope of their
employment. This is the rule even when the agent acts "wantonly or
recklessly or against the express orders of the principal. In such cases,
liability is not imputed because the principal actually participates in
the malice or fraud, but because the act is done for the benefit of the
25. See cases cited at 212 U.S. at 487 (excerpt from government brief).
26. Elkins Act, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847 (1903).
27. 212 U.S. at 491-92.
28. Id. at 492.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 492-93 (quoting BISHoP, NEw CRmNAL LAW § 417).
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principal.",3' A writing or board resolution is not necessary to confer
upon the agent this power to create liability.
The Court then took the leap that planted federal law firmly on
the shore where the law still rests:
Applying the principle governing civil liability, we go only a step
farther in holding that the act of the agent... may be controlled,
in the interest of public policy, by imputing his act to the employer
and imposing penalties upon the corporation for which he is
acting. .... 32
Implicit in this analysis is a rejection of the corporation's constitutional
arguments. The corporation acts, for good or ill, through agents, and
the shareholders must accept all the consequences of the form of busi-
ness in which they have chosen to invest.
The holding of Central Railroad has been followed without ques-
tion in the succeeding decades.33 Of course, the corporation must be
proven to exist.34 Once that proof is made, no matter how low in the
corporate hierarchy the offending agent may have been, her or his acts
are imputed to the entity.35 For example, in CIT Corp v. United
States,36 the court of appeals rejected the corporation's argument that
a branch manager of a major national company could not make the
corporation liable for a conspiracy to submit false loan documents to
a federal agency. There is a district court decision holding that the
31. 212 U.S. at 493.
32. Id. at 494. The Court went on to explain:
It is true that there are some crimes, which in their nature cannot be committed
by corporations. But there is a large class of offenses, of which rebating under the
Federal statutes is one, wherein the crime consists in purposely doing the things
prohibited by statute. In that class of crimes we see no good reason why corporations
may not be held responsible for and charged with the knowledge and purpose of their
agents, acting within the authority conferred upon them.
Id. at 494-95.
33. See, e.g. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 127 (5th Cir. 1962). For a brief but
authoritative discussion, see Brickey, Corporate Criminal Liability: A Primer for Corporate Counsel,
40 Bus. LAw. 129 (1984).
34. See, e.g., Melrose Distillers, Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 271 (1959) (under the law of their
states of incorporation, the defendant dissolved entities had enough "existence" to be proper Sherman
Act defendants).
35. See, e.g., United States v. George F. Fish, Inc., 154 F.2d 798,801 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328
U.S. 869 (1946); United States v. Dye Constr. Co., 510 F.2d 78,82 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Steiner Plastics Mfr. Co., 231 F.2d 149,152 (2d Cir. 1956); St. Johnsbury Trucking Co. v. United States,
220 F.2d 393 (1st Cir. 1955); United States v. Armour & Co, 168 F.2d 342 (3d Cir. 1948). See cases
collected in Brickey, supra note 33 at 131 n. 11; Elkins, supra note 1, at 103.
36. 150 F.2d 85, 89 (9th Cir. 1945).
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culpable involvement of someone in a managerial capacity would be
necessary to hold a corporation guilty of conspiracy.37 But the Fifth
Circuit's opinion reversing the case on other grounds leaves no doubt
that this position is insupportable.38
The corporation may even be criminally liable for acts done in
flat violation of company policy and the direct instructions of the
offender's superior.3 9 Indeed, the employee's acts need not have con-
ferred a benefit on the corporation.
[B]enefit is evidential in determining the purpose and motive for
which the agent does the act in question. If it is done with a view
of furthering the master's business, of doing something for the
master, then the expectation or hope of a benefit, whether direct
or indirect, makes the act that of the principal. The act is no less
the principal's if from such intended conduct either no benefit
accrues, a benefit is undiscernible, or, for that matter, the result
turns out to be adverse.4a
One may intuitively grasp the concept of imputing an agent's ac-
tions to the principal, particularly when the principal is a legal fiction
that cannot "act" except through humans. Attribution of the agent's
"knowledge" and "intent" poses more difficult problems. Moreover,
attribution becomes more problematic when several employees par-
ticipated in the conduct that is claimed to have been criminal. This
issue has been the subject of several important federal cases.
In United States v. TIME-DC, Inc,41 the corporation was found
guilty of knowingly and willfully violating a federal regulation that
forbade requiring or permitting an interstate truck driver from operating
the truck while fatigued or ill or likely to become so. The company
had begun a policy to discourage absenteeism, and required drivers to
obtain a doctor's note for claimed illnesses. Two drivers called in
sick. The dispatcher told them their absences were unexcused, and
may not have informed them that they could cure this situation by
obtaining a doctor's letter. Both drivers decided to come to work.
Both were, the court found, actually ill. The court concluded that the
company had a policy of not notifying drivers that they could obtain
doctor's excuses for absences.
37. United States v. Thompson-Powell Drilling Co., 196 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Tex. 1961), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1962).
38. 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir 1962). See generally Brickey, supra note 33.
39. See supra text accompanying notes 82-90.
40. 307 F.2d at 128-29.
41. 381 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. Va. 1974).
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The company officials all testified that they knew of the federal
regulation on fatigued or ill drivers. The regulation was known at all
levels of the company, even by the drivers, who were independently
obliged to obey it. The court rejected the company's contention that
"willful" meant the specific intent to violate a known legal duty, as is
the case under many federal felony statutes. Proof of pervasive aware-
ness of the regulation sustained the government's burden on this
element.
The main issue, therefore, was whether the corporation had
"knowledge" of the drivers' condition and required them to work
anyway. In language that has often been cited, the court set out a
"collective knowledge" theory:
[K]nowledge acquired by employees within the scope of their
employment is imputed to the corporation. In consequence, a
corporation cannot plead innocence by asserting that the informa-
tion obtained by several employees was not acquired by any one
individual employee who then should have comprehended its full
import. Rather, the corporation is considered to have acquired
the collective knowledge of its employees and is held responsible
for their failure to act accordingly.42
The court found that the corporation "through its various
employees" knew that one of the drivers was sick.43 In reaching this
conclusion, it recognized that in the usual case, a collective knowledge
requirement makes sense because the "knowledge" at issue has been
embodied in writings available to all the employees whose conduct is
being considered. But the court said the same rule should apply even
where there were no writings. This is justified as a means of enforcing
the policy of the federal regulations concerning unsafe driving.
TIME-DC can be defended as involving a regulatory misdemeanor
with a relatively trivial intent requirement. It seems reasonable to put
a duty on the corporation to see that information about drivers' physical
condition is shared among all those responsible for putting the trucks
on the road. The TIME-DC analysis has, however, been extended into
the realm of traditional felony jurisprudence.
In United States v. Bank of New England, NA, 44 the court of ap-
peals affirmed the bank's conviction of thirty-one felony charges of
42. 381 F. Supp. at 738-39, citing Steere Tank Lines, Inc., v. United States, 330 F.2d 719 (5th Cir.
1963); Riss & Co. v. United States, 262 F.2d 245 (8th Cir. 1958); Inland Freight Lines v. United States,
191 F.2d 313 (10th Cir. 1951).
43. 381 F. Supp. at 739.
44. 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987).
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failing to file reports of bank customer currency transactions of $10,000
or more, as part of a pattern of such law violations. 45 The statute
requires the government to prove that the violations were done "will-
fully," and caselaw interprets this to mean "proof of the defendant's
knowledge of the reporting requirements and his specific intent to com-
mit the crime., 46 There was no question that a single bank employee
knew that each transaction involved at least $10,000: The customer
whose transactions were at issue had brought in several checks totalling
over $10,000 and cashed them with a single teller, who "would transfer
to him in a single motion a wad of cash totalling more than $10,000."'
The tellers who handed out the cash, and the patron who received
it, were acquitted by the jury. The bank was convicted based on in-
structions that permitted aggregating the knowledge of several
employees to equal specific intent. This is obviously a different inquiry
than in TIME-DC, where the statute required only knowledge of the
drivers' physical condition. In a corporation, reporting of facts on
which a decision is based flows down to managers and up to senior
management. It is in that sense that the TIME-DC court invokes the
image of collective knowing: the only relevant knowledge is whether
the driver is sick, a one dimensional factual inquiry.
By contrast, Bank of New England involves felony liability requir-
ing proof of intent to violate a known legal duty. Since the elements
of a legal duty may be innocent in themselves, dividing knowledge
erodes one's certainty that any employee acted with a sense of wrong-
fulness.
Yet, the court of appeals quoted TIME-DC at some length, and
held:
A collective knowledge instruction is entirely appropriate in the
context of corporate criminal liability .... Corporations com-
partmentalize knowledge, subdividing the elements of specific
duties and operations into smaller components. The aggregate of
those components constitutes the corporation's knowledge of a
particular operation. It is irrelevant whether employees ad-
ministering one component of an operation know the specific
activities of employees administering another aspect of the
operation.48
45. 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (West Supp.1989).
46. 821 F.2d at 854 (quoting United States v. Hernando Ospina, 798 F.2d 1570, 1580 (11th Cir
1986)).
47. 821 F.2d at 848-49.
48. Id. at 856 (citing TJM.E.-DC, 381 F.Supp. at 738).
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The court rejected the bank's argument that it was in effect being
punished for "negligently maintaining a poor communications net-
work".
49
On the issue of intent to violate the law, the court of appeals
upheld a jury instruction that permitted conviction if (a) one bank
employee acted with the specific intent to violated the law, or (b) the
"failure to file was the result of some flagrant organizational indif-
ference."50
Bank of New England appears to stretch the logic of TIME-DC
beyond recognition. The felony sanction is generally reserved for
serious conduct that is undertaken in deliberate defiance of the law:
no matter what the evil, we do not punish the evil-doing hand unless
it was actuated by the evil-meaning mind. The principle of lenity-
also called strict interpretation of criminal statutes-is routinely in-
voked to reflect this social value. When Congress puts a felony offense
at the top of a pyramid of administrative and civil enforcement, the
Supreme Court takes this as a signal to eschew the sort of "public
welfare offense" ideology that is reflected in TIME-DC. The "duty to
find out the facts and law and obey" has little place in felony cases.
Any other rule is not only hostile to the constitutional protections that
are to accompany and precede decisions in criminal cases, but also
risks trivializing the criminal sanction."'
In Bank of New England, the court approved jury instructions that
would permit a conviction when nobody in the bank knew that multi-
check transactions of $10,000 or more violated the law, but where the
knowledge of many bank employees of small parts of the legal require-
ments could be aggregated to a hypothetical sum equal to such
knowledge.
Consider the effect of such an instruction in a typical Sherman
Act Section 1 conspiracy case.52 The Act requires that the government
prove that the defendant knew of the anticompetitive effect of the chal-
lenged behavior.5 3 If the corporation may be found guilty by aggregat-
ing the knowledge of many employees, none of whom individually
knows enough to trigger any suspicion that something wrong is going
49. 821 F.2d at 856.
50. Id. at 855.
51. See supra text accompanying note 8.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Corp, 438 U.S. 422
(1978).
53. See United States Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 445-46.
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on, the criminal sanction will utterly fail to deter: nobody will have
any basis to take preventive measures. 4 A collective knowledge theory
would permit punishment of the corporation based upon the combined
conduct of individuals, each of whom is engaging in behavior that they
may legitimately feel is laudable in terms of antitrust policy goals.
More troubling is the court's approval of an intent instruction that
penalizes indifference. When willfulness is an element, the defendant
must be proven to have desired a result known to be unlawful. Proof
of indifference may help the jury to infer that the defendant had such
a desire. Some courts have approved-often with trepidation-so-
called "ostrich" jury instructions, that such an inference is permissible.5
Going beyond the "ostrich" charge to tell a jury that indifference may
equal intent amounts to saying that one is presumed to intend conse-
quences to which one is indifferent. That sort of presumption strikes
directly and probably unconstitutionally at the requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the offense. 6
On the facts of Bank of New England, one is tempted to say that
no harm was done. The temptation should be avoided. While the
court of appeals stressed evidence that management was hostile to the
currency transaction reporting requirements, its unwise rule of law can-
not be justified by noting that some particular defendant is unworthy. 7
The facts allegedly showing the bank management's disingenuousness
might well have convinced a jury that management had the specific
intent to violate the law. It is, however, far more likely that the bank
management was simply indulging a questionable but honestly-held
belief that the law meant that in multi-check transactions the reporting
requirements are not triggered: a belief that negates the intent to vio-
late the law.
58
Predictably, the responses to Bank of New England have been
54. More seriously, the Supreme Court emphasized in a leading Sherman Act case that some
exchanges of pricing information may be procompetitive. United States Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 441 n.16.
55. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, 864 F.2d 544, 549-50 (7th Cir. 1988) (trial court's use of
conscious avoidance or "ostrich" instruction not reversible error).
56. See generally Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979); United States v. Adamson, 700
F.2d 953 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 833 (1983). See also Miller, supra note 18, at 57-58.
57. "[W]e cannot dispense with constitutional privileges because in a specific instance they may
not in fact serve any valid interest of their possessor .... All governments, democracies as well as
autocracies, believe that those they seek to punish are guilty; the impediment of constitutional barriers
are galling to all governments when they prevent the consummation of that just purpose. But those
barriers were devised and are precious because they prevent that purpose and its pursuit from passing
unchallenged by the accused...." United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 638 (2d Cir. 1950).
58. It must be noted, however, that Gypsum has been held not to change the standards for imputing
employee intent to the corporate employer. United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th
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mixed. John Villa, author of a leading treatise on banking crimes, has
strongly and cogently criticized the decision for eroding traditional
mens rea principles." In the same symposium, three authors urge that
the rationale of Bank of New England be extended to defective pricing
cases against defense contractors?6 The view that "a corporation can
be held to have a particular state of mind only when that state of mind
is possessed by a single individual" was restated in First Equity Corp.
v. Standard & Poor's Corporation.6'
Corporations are subject to myriad legal duties defined in
thousands of sets of laws and regulations. In seeking to accommodate
the desire to make a profit with the desire to steer clear of law violation,
they will often calculate with some care the line between legality and
illegality. They may take fairly aggressive stances on the meaning of
complex laws. This attitude may be seen most clearly in the income
tax area. While civil or even misdemeanor liability will justly await
the management that guesses wrong, a strong tradition counsels against
bestowing felony status.
F. Model Penal Code and State Laws
The Model Penal Code, 62 which has been the basis for recodifica-
tion of the criminal law in most states,6s imposes criminal liability upon
a corporation under three circumstances. First, the corporation will be
liable for a petty offense or for a crime defined by some statute other
than the Code on the basis of an agent's conduct within the scope of
employment.' 4 This provision tends to limit penal liability to instances
in which the legislature has specifically expressed the intention of
punishing corporations. Second, the corporation will be liable if "the
offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirm-
ative performance imposed on corporations by law., 65  Third, the
Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983); United States v. Koppers Co., 652 F.2d 290, 298 (2d Cir.), cert
denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981).
59. Villa, A Critical View of Bank Secrecy Act Enforcement and the Money Laundering Statutes,
37 CATH. U.L. REV. 489,497-500 (1988).
60. Shirk, Greenberg & Dawson, Truth or Consequences: Expanding Civil and Criminal Liability
for the Defective Pricing of Government Contracts, 37 CATH. U.L. REv. 935,977-79 (1988).
61. 690 F. Supp. 256,259-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
62. Model Penal Code (Proposed Official Draft 1962). For a brief history of the Code's corporate
liability provisions, see Brickey, Rethinking Corporate Liability Under the Model Penal Code, 19
RuTGERS LJ. 593 (1988).
63. See generally Brickey, supra note 62, at 633-34.
64. Model Penal Code § 2.07(1)(a).
65. Model Penal Code § 2.07(1)(b).
226
Corporate Criminal Liability
provision that applies to most criminal statutes under which a corpora-
tion might be charged imposes liability if "the commission of the of-
fense was authorized, requested, commanded, performed or recklessly
tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting
within the scope of his office or employment. 66
The Model Penal Code's wide acceptance in the states has not
extended to these provisions limiting criminal liability. Professor
Brickey's compilation of state statutes following the Code reveals that
a number of them have to one degree or another added language that
more nearly approaches the federal rule.67 A leading treatise on cor-
porate law states flatly that "[m]ost state courts apply the same respon-
deat superior principles to corporate liability as the federal courts.
68
Detailed treatment of state law differences is beyond the scope of
this article; individual state statutes vary considerably.69 However,
Model Penal Code and federal law positions account for a great
majority of the state rules, so a working knowledge of these two
alternatives is adequate for most purposes.7"
II. DEFENSES TO CORPORATE CRIMINAL LAi~ rrY
A. No Intent to Benefit the Corporation
While the agent's conduct need not have actually benefitted the
corporation, 71 the intent to benefit must be proven. If the agent is
66. Model Penal Code § 2.07(l)(c).
67. Brickey, supra note 62, at 633-34. See also, Brickey, Death in the Workplace: Corporate
Liability for Criminal Homicide, 2 NOTRE DAME J. OF LAw, ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 753 (1987).
68. lOW FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 4942 at 620-21 (penn.
ed. 1978).
69. See generally Note, Developments in the Law: Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate
Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1227 (1972). Representative state statutes
include ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-305 and § 5-2-502(3)(A) (1987); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-401 -
41-403 (1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-606 (1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 281(3)a & b, and tit.
11, § 284(b) (1987); GA. CODEANN. § 16-2-22 (1984); HAw. REV. STAT. § 702-227(3) (1985); ILL REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 5-4 (1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-2-3 (Bums 1986); IOWA CODE § 703.5 (1979);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 3206 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 502.050(1)(c) (Baldwin 1987); Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 562.056 (1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-311 (1987); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-7 (West 1982); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 20.20 (Consol. 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-03-02 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2901.23(c) and § 2901.23(A)(4) (Anderson 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.170 (1987); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. 307(a)(1) (Purdon 1983); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.22(a)(2) (Vernon 1974); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9A.08.030 (1988).
70. For a critical view of both federal and state rules, see Mueller, supra note 2 (noting that most
civil law jurisdictions do not impose criminal liability on corporations at all). See also Brickey, supra
note 62, at 596.
71. See also Old Monastery Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 905 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 326 U.S.
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acting in violation of the fiduciary duty owed the corporation, for ex-
ample in order to gain personal profit, the corporation will not be char-
geable with his conduct.
The leading case is Standard Oil Company of Texas v. United
States.72 Based upon the conduct of three of its employees, Standard
Oil and an affiliated pipeline company were indicted for violation of
the Connally Hot Oil Act. 73 The employees made up false run tickets
that misstated the amount of crude oil produced from wells owned by
the Thompson Corporation and pumped through Standard's facilities.
The scheme permitted Thompson to produce more oil than was allowed
under federal law. Thompson paid the Standard employees for falsify-
ing the tickets.
The Fifth Circuit reversed the convictions of Standard and its af-
filiate. Judge Brown acknowledged that the knowledge gained by
employees is usually imputed to the corporation, as well as the intent
with which the employees act. But, he said, this principle applies only
when the employee is acting within the scope of employment:
Under a statute requiring that there be "a specific wrongful
intent," and the "presence of culpable intent as a necessary
element of the offense .... the corporation does not acquire that
knowledge or possess the "requisite state of mind essential for
responsibility," through the activities of unfaithful servants
whose conduct was undertaken to advance the interests of parties
other than their corporate employer.74
The decisive fact in reversing the convictions was not that Stan-
dard and its affiliate in fact received no benefit, nor even that they
were compelled to pay twice for oil purportedly received from
Thompson. Rather, the employees "intended" no benefit, and were
faithlessly violating their fiduciary duty. Standard Oil has been fol-
lowed in the Fifth Circuit, and in other circuits that have considered
the issue.75
Standard Oil provides a "game plan" for the corporation charged
with wrongdoing, whether in a criminal case or in a civil action-such
as RICO-based upon alleged criminality. Consider, for example, a
scheme in which an employee has agreed to a territorial division or
734 (1945); United States v. Empire Packing Co., 174 F.2d 16 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 959
(1949).
72. 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1962).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 715 (1976) (original version at ch. 18, § 1, 49 Stat. 30 (1935)).
74. 307 F.2d at 129 (citing Boyce Motor Lines, Inc., v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342 (1952);
United States v. Chicago Express, Inc., 235 F.2d 785,786 (7th Cir. 1956)).
75. See, e.g., United States v. DeMauro, 581 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1978). Standard Oil was reaffirmed
in United States v. Ridglea State Bank, 357 F.2d 495,498-500 (5th Cir 1966).
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price-fixing scheme, and is then personally involved in carrying out
the plan. Arguably, such conduct is designed to improve the corporate
employer's profit picture, and therefore to benefit it.
When the accusations are made, the corporation faces a decision
on strategy that must be made early and applied consistently. It must
decide whether to admit wrongdoing and settle potential litigation, fight
on the basis that no law was violated, or claim that the errant employees
were acting for their own and not the entity's interest. Early decision
is necessary because the strategy chosen dictates fact-finding tactics,
attorney selection, and attitudes towards the defense of the alleged
individual wrongdoers.76
In the hypothetical above, the company should look for evidence
that the employee was profiting personally from the anticompetitive
behavior, for example by using the unlawful agreement to carve out a
sales territory in a way that increased his own compensation and im-
proved his position in the company. Often, the errant employee will
also have falsified expense and time reports in order to mask his un-
lawful activity, or even to pocket additional cash. Diligent and ag-
gressive investigation may even disclose that the employee is in concert
with others to start up or aid a competing business, or is receiving
kickbacks from the competitor. It is likely, however, that the evidence
that the employee had no intent to benefit the corporation will seldom
be overwhelming.
B. Lack of Authority
The issue of lack of authority is obviously related both to that of
intent to benefit the corporation and that of actions contrary to cor-
porate policy. After all, an agent is expected to seek to benefit the
corporation, and the agent's authority cannot be defined other than by
instructions on policies and procedures to be followed. The issue is
worthy of separate consideration, however, because it is usually treated
separately in criminal jury instructions, and is a recognized topic in
the general corporate law.
76. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss defense tactics in detail. If the corporation is to
claim that an employee violated a fiduciary duty, it will have a more difficult timejustifying reimbursing
that person's legal fees, and even in continuing to employ that person. The answers to such questions
depend upon the law of the state of incorporation, as well as upon strategic considerations. But see
Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966) (taxpayer may take deduction for legal fees in unsuccess-
ful defense against business-related criminal charges). The employee "cut off" or "tossed out" might
decide to gain revenge by making accusations against people more senior in the company: This is known
as the "I confess! He did it!" phenomenon.
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The case law upholds quite broad instructions on agency in the
criminal setting. For example, in United States v. American Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corp.,78 the court of appeals upheld a jury in-
struction that said in part:
In order for a corporation to be responsible for the acts or
statements of one of its agents it is not necessary that the corpora-
tion specifically authorize the agent to commit the act or make
the statement. A corporation is legally bound by the acts and
statements of its agents done or made within the scope of their
employment or their apparent authority .... Apparent authority
is the authority which outsiders could reasonably assume that the
agent would have, judging from his position with the company,
the responsibilities previously entrusted to him, and the cir-
cumstances surrounding his past conduct.79
The court was careful to insist that the corporation is entitled to
separate instructions, requiring the government to prove "both that the
agents' acts were within his authority, and within the course of his
employment, that is, performed with the intention of benefitting the
corporation."'
This dual burden will have little importance in most cases. Con-
sider, for example, the case of a lower-level employee who hears the
company is being investigated, and who fears that incriminating docu-
ments are in the company's files. The employee removes and destroys
the documents. The conduct is clearly done with the intent to benefit
the corporation, but the employee's job description and responsibilities
may exclude any duty or right to make decisions about keeping docu-
ments. While the law of apparent authority, borrowed from the rules
applicable to civil cases, is skewed in favor of finding that authority
exists, the issue is worth a second look in a criminal case.
The government in such a case must prove both prongs of the
agency basis for corporate responsibility, and the proof must be beyond
a reasonable doubt.8" This burden can be significant when seeking to
convince a judge--or a jury. The jury, hearing both of the employee's
lowly status and of corporate policies forbidding all employees from
77. See, e.g., United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
956 (1983); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1962); Brickey, supra note 33, at
131.
78. 433 F.2d 174,204-05 (3d Cir. 1970).
79. Id. at 204.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 205.
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document destruction, may well have a reasonable doubt either about
the employee's mental state or his authority.
C. Actions Contrary to Corporate Policy
Despite the Model Penal Code formulation, and scholarly 2 and
judicial83 criticism, federal courts continue to subject corporations to
criminal liability even for acts contrary to corporate policy. A leading
case is United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp.84 Western International
Hotels Company, along with other operators of hotels, restaurants and
allied businesses, organized to attract convention business to Portland,
Oregon. They persuaded suppliers to contribute by refusing to deal
with those who would not contribute and directing their patronage
towards givers. This was, according to the court of appeals, a per se
violation of the Sherman Act.
Western International's president and hotel manager testified that
the hotel bought supplies based only on price, quality and service.
They had instructed the hotel's purchasing agent to have nothing to do
with the boycott. The agent said that he had disobeyed these orders,
"because of anger and personal pique toward the individual repre-
senting the supplier.,
85
The court nonetheless upheld the corporation's criminal convic-
tion, and approved the trial judge's rejection of jury instructions that
would have limited corporate liability for an agent's unauthorized act.
The instructions rested instead on concepts of apparent authority,86 and
expressly said:
A corporation is responsible for acts and statements of its agents,
done or made within the scope of their employment, even though
their conduct may be contrary to their actual instructions or
contrary to the corporation's stated policies.
Hilton has been cited repeatedly, ostensibly in approval of this broad
language.7
Commentators have argued that Hilton goes too far because it
82. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 18 at 68; Note, Corporate Criminal Liability for Acts in Violation
of Company Policy, 50 GEo. L.J. 547 (1962); Hamilton, Corporate CriminalLiability in Texas, 47 TEX.
L. REv. 60 (1968). Professor Hamilton is not only an authority on corporate law, but a dedicated
proponent of responsible corporate governance; his views are therefore entitled to weight.
83. See Miller, supra note 18 at 62-63 and cases cited.
84. 467 F.2d 1000(9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
85. Id. at 1004.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 77-81.
87. See, e.g., United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1125 (1983); United States v. Gibson Products Co., 426 F. Supp 768 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
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expressly forbids the corporation from relying upon its internal com-
pliance policies.8 After all, the argument runs, corporations should be
encouraged to have such policies, and to take steps to enforce them.
One answer to this contention is that the existence of such policies will
probably be taken into account by prosecutors in making the discre-
tionary decision whether or not to charge the corporation.
Whether or not one agrees with such policy-based criticism, the
Hilton instruction is wrong unless the "is responsible" is read as mean-
ing "may be responsible." A corporate compliance policy, broadly dis-
tributed to employees, is surely evidence that employees' authority does
not extend to acts in violation of the policy. While contrary evidence
may show that the policy was in fact administered with a knowing
wink and a conspiratorial nod, that is a far different matter from reject-
ing its relevance altogether.
The argument will be stronger if the compliance policy is made
known to the company's customers, suppliers, rivals and co-venturers.
For then the "outsider," by whose imagined perception apparent
authority is judged, cannot plausibly be said to believe the lawbreaking
agent is acting for the corporation.
The view that compliance policies are relevant has been accepted.
In United States v. Basic Construction Co.,89 the court noted that "[i]n
the instant case, the district court properly allowed the jury to consider
Basic's alleged antitrust compliance policy in determining whether the
employees were acting for the benefit of the corporation."90
II. OTHER ASSOCIATIONAL LiABILrry IssuEs
A corporation may be liable for the criminal acts of subsidiaries
and divisions.9' Even though the Supreme Court has limited the
88. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 18, at 61-68. Miller relies on Holland Furnace Co. v. United States,
158 F.2d 2(6th Cir. 1946), which rejected the New York Centralrule as resting upon the unique language
of the Elkins Act. The court contrasted the language of the wartime act at issue in Holland and acquitted
the company based upon evidence of its good faith effort to control the activity of its agents. Id. at 6-8.
Holland is badly-reasoned in rejecting the authority of New York Central, and is in any event of little
generative force due to its reliance on the language of the special statute it was construing.
89. 711 F.2d 570 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983).
90. Id. at 573.
91. See Obermaier, Vicarious Liability of Corporations and Corporate Officers, in NEw DEvE.OP.
MENTS AND PERSPECH1VES ON CORPORATE CRIME LAW ENFORCEMENT IN AMERICA 51, 82-84 (L. Orland
& H. Tyler eds. 1987); Brickey, supra note 33, at 133-34.
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doctrine of the intracorporate conspiracy in the antitrust setting, 92 the
scope of this doctrine is uncertain as applied to ordinary crimes.
A corporation may be liable for the criminal conduct imputed to
a newly-acquired subsidiary or division, and based on acts done before
the acquisition. In United States v. Wilshire Oil Company of Texas,
93
Wilshire had purchased Riffe Petroleum Company and operated it as
an unincorporated division. Before the purchase, a Rifle employee had
joined in a conspiracy to rig bids on liquid asphalt. The evidence
showed, according to the court of appeals, that Wilshire had at least
ratified the agent's conduct.94 It is difficult to tell if the court of ap-
peals held Wilshire criminally liable because it found evidence of post-
acquisition conscious wrongdoing by Wilshire-Riffe, or because
Wilshire "took the conspiracy as it found it" and should have been
more diligent in detecting and disavowing the benefits of the deal. But
the case stands as a warning in that all corporate closets should be
searched before the new family moves in.
This sort of "flow-through" liability has been sustained in criminal
prosecutions of successors to failed banks. In United States v. Central
National Bank,95 the court held that the surviving bank was criminally
liable for criminal currency violations committed by the institution with
which it had merged.
One must also note that the breadth of 1 USC § 1 extends more
broadly than "corporations." While most students of corporate criminal
law know that under the RICO statute any sort of entity may be an
"enterprise,' 6 fewer may know that all "impersonal entities"97 may be
subjected to criminal liability. The Supreme Court, finding a partner-
ship guilty of a crime, stressed that the same rule of imputing agents'
activities will be applied in order to deny "the fruits of violations" to
"the treasury of the business."
98
IV. CONCLUSION
Lawyers-especially litigating lawyers-learn early in their
careers that the facts do not announce themselves, but must usually be
92. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (rejecting intracor-
porate conspiracy doctrine in the antitrust area).
93. 427 F.2d 969 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829 (1970).
94. Id. at 973-74.
95. 705 F. Supp. 336 (S.D. Tex. 1988). The court does not cite Wilshire.
96. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (4) (1970); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576,581-83 (1981).
97. United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 125 (1958).
98. 358 U.S. at 126.
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culled from the shifting memories of witnesses and the ambiguous
traces left in documents. This inherent ambiguity need not be daunting.
Defense against charges of wrongdoing, at the stage of negotiating an
end to trouble and in litigation, involves "hat hanging." The lawyer
is looking for a plausible peg on which the prosecutor or the jury can
hang its hat.
Earnest and cogent critics will seek to change federal law to
resemble the Model Penal Code formulation. For the reasons given, I
think such a change would be an error. I prefer instead a more modest
approach. The present federal rules encourage management to adopt
and enforce procedures to deter and detect law violations done on the
corporation's behalf. Often, the existence and effectiveness of such
policies will convince a prosecutor to forego bringing a criminal case.
When the corporation is brought to trial, however, it should be
permitted to put its policies before the jury. Nominally, the jury will
be asking whether the human agent acted with intent and within his
authority. We must not, however, forget that this two-sided inquiry is
directed at resolving the issue of imputed intent-did the corporation
act with a culpable mental state. On that issue, the latitude of intro-
ducing evidence has traditionally been broad.
If the corporation elects to put its good faith in issue, it must be
held to have opened the door to other misdeeds that show its policies
to be ineffective or cynical. With the issue opened up in this way, the
jury's decisionmaking in corporate crime cases would more nearly
resemble that of the ordinary criminal case in which the defendant
takes the stand or puts on character evidence. This approach not only
encourages management to have policies on wrongdoing, but to police
them in ways that will convince a bystander that they mean what
they say.
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